Advisory summary. The BookIt appointment booking plugin for WordPress versions <= 2.6.0.5 contained an unauthenticated Broken Access Control vulnerability that allowed any visitor submitting a public booking request to supply payment_status=complete and record an unpaid appointment as paid. The issue is tracked as CVE-2026-110900 and fixed in version 2.6.0.6 (released 15 October 2026).
- Product: BookIt (WordPress plugin by Liquid Web / StellarWP, slug
bookit) - Affected / Patched:
<= 2.6.0.5/ Fixed in2.6.0.6 - Classification: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) · CVSS 3.1: 5.3 (Medium) (
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N) - Credit: Alpaslan Fatih Sözer (reported via Patchstack Bug Bounty Program)
BookIt exposes a public AJAX endpoint so unauthenticated site visitors can book appointments and select a payment method. While inspecting the plugin's booking handler in a local isolated test installation in October 2026, I observed that server-owned payment status fields were accepted directly from client-supplied POST parameters.
Root cause
Three code paths interacted to allow client-controlled payment status storage:
- The booking AJAX action
bookit_book_appointmentis intentionally registered for unauthenticated users (trueflag inincludes/classes/AjaxActions.php). CleanHelper::cleanData()sanitized unknown POST keys withsanitize_text_field()and passed them through rather than rejecting fields absent from the allowlist:
// includes/helpers/CleanHelper.php (2.6.0.5)
foreach ( $data as $key => $value ) {
$value = sanitize_text_field( $value );
if ( ! array_key_exists( $key, $rules ) ) {
$data[ $key ] = $value; // unlisted keys preserved
continue;
}
...
- Because
payment_statuswas neither listed in the cleaning rules nor stripped byAppointmentController::save(), the database layer wrote the client-supplied value directly into the payment record:
// includes/classes/database/Appointments.php (2.6.0.5)
'status' => ( ! empty( $data['payment_status'] ) ) ? $data['payment_status'] : Payments::$defaultStatus,
This fallback existed so free services could mark their own payment record complete, but because the same array key was open to untrusted $_POST input, adding payment_status=complete to a standard paid-service booking stored the payment status as complete without contacting any payment gateway.
Scope and impact boundaries
- Observed impact: An unauthenticated booking request with
payment_status=completecreated a payment record marked complete in the WordPress admin dashboard and reserved the appointment time slot while outbound network logs confirmed zero communication with any payment provider. - Limits noted in the report: The forged record did not trigger a payment-completed webhook, left transaction ID and payment timestamp fields empty, and kept the appointment status itself as pending. Administrators reconciling against payment-provider records could spot the discrepancy, though staff relying on the plugin dashboard alone could deliver unpaid services.
- Testing boundary: Verified exclusively on a local, isolated WordPress test installation.
Vendor fix (version 2.6.0.6)
Version 2.6.0.6 strips any client-supplied payment_status value in AppointmentController::save() immediately after input cleaning:
// includes/classes/AppointmentController.php (2.6.0.6)
$data = CleanHelper::cleanData( $_POST, self::getCleanRules() );
// Payment status is server-owned; drop any client value so a public booking can't be stored as paid.
unset( $data['payment_status'] );
Remediation
- Update BookIt to version 2.6.0.6 or later.
- Reconcile historical appointments marked paid prior to the update against your payment processor dashboard, paying attention to records showing a completed status without a transaction ID.
- Treat payment-provider confirmation rather than plugin display status as the source of truth before delivering paid services.
Disclosure timeline
- 7 October 2026: Vulnerability discovered, verified locally, and reported via Patchstack.
- 8 October 2026: Validated by Patchstack and forwarded to the vendor.
- 15 October 2026: Vendor released BookIt 2.6.0.6 with researcher credit in the changelog.
- 16 October 2026: CVE-2026-110900 published in the CVE List and Patchstack Vulnerability Database.
For the full Turkish technical and legal commentary, see the Turkish write-up. Related advisories: CVE-2026-48201 (Fast Velocity Minify) and CVE-2026-111835 (Swish for WooCommerce). For Turkish cybersecurity and KVKK legal guidance, see IT law, cybersecurity and KVKK in Türkiye.
References
Published 21 November 2026 after coordinated disclosure and patch release (2.6.0.6).